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The United Kingdom approached its negotiations
with the European Union (EU) in the 1960s and
1970s with some hesitation similar to what we wit-
ness today around the euro.There were those claim-
ing that EU membership was essential for trade and
prosperity while opposing voices insisted that it
would impinge on political and economic sovereign-
ty. The attitudes revealed by the groups opposed to
further integration could be characterized as an
“island mentality” in that the proponents have a
strong urge to maintain the identity of the nation
and its independence in most spheres, yet are afraid
of being left out and excluded by their neighbours.
The island mentality is if anything stronger in
Iceland where the same issues are currently being
debated. The arguments proposed for and against
joining the EU and adopting the euro mirror those
raised in the UK but the debate is even more inter-
esting because the choices faced are starker. Iceland
has only 300 thousand inhabitants, which is roughly
the population of the London suburbs of Ealing
(305.019) and Camden (210.661) or the German
cities of Bonn (302.200) and Karlsruhe (276.600).
Iceland is to a greater extent than the UK dependent
on trade, its labour market is even less integrated
with continental Europe and its economic shocks are
more asymmetric. A rather half-baked solution was
concocted fourteen years ago when Iceland joined
the European Economic Area – negotiated between
the EU and seven EFTA states in 1992 – guarantee-
ing the freedom of movement of goods, services,
labour and capital within the areas.1,2
In this article we will not discuss the costs and bene-
fits of EU membership for Iceland.Instead,we focus
on the choice of an optimal currency regime, which
we find interesting due to the very small size of
Iceland’s economy and the fact that the health of the
tiny Icelandic krona has recently started to play a
role in world financial markets: the recent deprecia-
tion of the krona scared investors (the carry traders)
out of many emerging market economies causing a
contagion and depreciation of currencies in places
such as Hungary, New Zealand, Turkey, and Latin
America. Following a brief monetary history of Ice-
land, we first describe Iceland in light of the optimal
currency area literature and then move on to what
we find the more interesting aspects of this question
relevant to microstates such as Iceland. These
involve small government bureaucracy, imperfect
competition in the service sector, monetary policy
and international capital flows, banking supervision,
and the risk premium.We conclude with a summary
and comments about Iceland’s future monetary
arrangements.
Iceland’s monetary history abridged 
Iceland was settled in the 9th and 10th centuries and
after early exploitation of its natural wealth (mainly
forests) it remained poor for over a thousand years.
The nation preserved in its memory vivid descrip-
tions of the old Viking society – interesting for its
lack of a formal state – its heroes and battles cap-
tured in the Sagas.3 But its economy never took off,
not until the end of the 19th century. In spite of a
rather lively period of trade in the 16th century,tech-
nology remained stagnant, population did not grow
and living standards did not improve, providing a
good example of Malthusian population dynamics.
The use of money was limited during the thousand
years of economic stagnation,to say the least.Barter
was the rule.4 The basic unit of account was wool.A
certain quantity of wool (“alin”) was used as a unit
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4 See Júlíusson et al. (1992).of account and its value pegged
to silver. Silver served as a store
of value but neither silver nor
wool was much used in transac-
tions.The value of land was mea-
sured in another unit – called a
“hundred” – and its value fixed
in terms of wool. Prior to 1873,
the only money used had been
Danish notes, first issued in
1713, but the Icelanders were
not keen on those because they
were difficult to store and the
main function of money was as a
store of value.
This all sounds rather complicat-
ed, which it was, and there were serious economic
consequences.First,trade was limited due to the lack
of a medium of exchange. Second, price ratios were
fixed for many centuries and did not respond to mar-
ket forces.5 Third, there was a profound lack of liq-
uidity – which further hampered trade – and capital
was limited, which made investment very difficult.
The consequences for the standard of living on the
island were dramatic.No data are available for GDP
up to 1870, but there is evidence that suggests that
the standard of living was considerably higher at the
end of the settlement period than at the beginning of
the 19th century. In effect the “take-off” of the
Icelandic economy did not occur until the middle-to-
late 19th century.6
Population growth in Iceland was dependent on the
forces of nature until the economic take-off at the
beginning of the 19th century. Earthquakes, volcanic
eruptions, drift ice from the arctic, glacier bursts,
harsh weather and epidemics affected population
growth profoundly. During the early settlements the
climate had been relatively warm and the cultivation
of a variety of crops possible. The climate became
harsher when temperatures declined resulting in
what is sometimes referred to as “the little ice-age”
from the end of the 11th century until the end of the
19th century. As a consequence, drift ice became
more common, which then made the climate even
more difficult to cope with.7 It is estimated that there
were approximately 32,000 inhabitants in Iceland at
the end of the settlement period, 78,000 in the early
13th century but, due to various reasons described
above, the population fell to almost 40 thousand
people towards the end of the 17th century.8 Figure 1
plots the population from the time of settlement to
the forecasted value in 2050.9
Improvements in the country’s monetary system
played an important role in the take-off of the
economy in the late 19th and early 20th century.
Denmark introduced its krona as official currency
in 1873 and in the same year the krona was intro-
duced in Iceland as official currency. Around the
same time foreign money started to come to the
island; the British paid for horses and sheep with
gold coins; Norwegians caught herring and whales
and paid workers in money; and around the turn of
the century a few shops started to accept money in
exchange for goods. In spite of this, the financial
system remained underdeveloped for a very long
time, in fact until quite recently.The first bank was
founded in the late 19th century. A private bank –
Islandsbanki – was founded in 1904 and given the
permission to issue money. This right was taken
away from it in 1927 and given to a state-owned
commercial bank that also had a note-issuing
department, the exclusive right then finally granted
a domestic central bank in 1961. The central bank
was effectively under the control of the government
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5 Unfortunately, the relative price of fish in terms of agricultural
commodities was artificially low so that the country did not take
full advantage of its comparative advantage.
6 This is based on the fact that conditions for farming deteriorated
after 1300. These harsher conditions, among other thing, changed
the population structure indicating malnutrition and poverty. See
Steffensen (1958).
7 Thorarinsson (1960).
8 Much of the population figures are estimates and guesswork since
the first general census was taken in Iceland in 1703, the first cen-
sus along modern lines covering the whole country. See
Thorarinsson (1961).
9 Data on population 874 to 1702 comes from Steffensen (1975) and
1703 to 1995 from Statistics Iceland (1997). Data on population
1996 to 2050 are from United Nations Population Division’s medi-
an variant population projections.CESifo Forum 2/2006 43
Special
for the next forty years, until it was given indepen-
dence by law in 2001.
Although wool had been exported from early on,
substantial export activity did not appear until the
13th century with the advent of fishing on a larger
scale. During the 12th century the price of fish in
Europe had started to increase and fishing became a
major occupation on the island after 1400, although
it was not the sole occupation of anyone.10
The take-off of the Icelandic economy can also be
traced to the liberalization of trade in the19th centu-
ry;and to the fact that warmer climate made agricul-
ture easier, which freed up labour to start other in-
dustries and commerce. Better fishing technologies
(such as sailing boats at the end of the 19th century
and motor boats and trawlers at the beginning of the
20th) also contributed to increased growth. Eco-
nomic growth rose dramatically when increased use
of money, a greater supply of capital, free trade and
new fishing technologies came together and allowed
the country to utilise its comparative advantage in
fishing. Increased income then had the effect of rais-
ing the demand for services,which gradually expand-
ed from the beginning of the 20th century. Figure 2
shows the distribution of employment across indus-
tries in Iceland from 1870 to 2000.11
In spite of this,the financial system remained under-
developed for decades to come. In the 1960s and
1970s the financial system had the appearance of
modernity, yet banks were predominantly state
owned and run by politicians, interest rates were
decided by decree and usually lower than the infla-
tion rate, capital was rationed and often distributed
along political lines and rent seeking was rampant.
The political parties were – and are to this day – rep-
resented on the Board of Governors of the central
bank (appointed by the Prime Minister), and even
more explicitly on the bank’s Supervisory Board
(elected by Parliament). Households invested in
real estate in order to protect their savings and what
little ended up in bank deposits was given out to
firms that paid sharply negative interest rates. As a
result, economic growth was mainly propelled by
steadily increasing fish catches,generated by contin-
uous investment in new fishing vessels as well as the
extension of the fishing zone to 200 miles following
disputes with the UK and Germany (the so-called
cod wars!).
Financial market liberalisation – initially in response
to steadily falling deposits in the banking system –
not surprising in the light of negative real interest
rates – started in the 1980s. The first step involved
the indexation of financial obligations in 1979.
Interest rates were subsequently made market deter-
mined.There followed the privatisation of commer-
cial banks in the 1990s.The country now has private
banking, international financial mobility, a central
bank that is independent by law with an explicit
inflation target, a public sector that – although not
really performing counter-cyclical policy – is some-
what frugal and does run budget surpluses in good
times. The contrast with the economy one hundred
years earlier could not be starker; the supply of cap-
ital is abundant, people with ideas and ambition can
get loans, there are no restrictions on foreign bor-
rowing or investing and the country has, in a span of
a few years, accumulated foreign assets that amount
to 250 percent of its GDP. The country now ranks
second on the Human Develop-
ment Index,12 and sixth in terms
of GDP per capita.The only EU
countries ranking higher in
terms of PPP income per capita
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10 This was due both to the seasonality of
fishing and laws that forced all workers
who did not own land to be continuously
registered on farms. These laws, abol-
ished in 1893, heavily restricted labour
mobility and entrepreneurship for many
centuries. However, it is estimated that
during the fishing season as much as half
of the male workforce was engaged in
fishing and fish processing.
11 Jónsson (1999) and the National
Economic Institute.
12The index is based on data on GDP per
capita, life expectancy, average years of
schooling and literacy rates. Source: UN
Development Program.they rank considerably lower on
the human development index.13
Now we come to the main ques-
tion posed in this paper: Should
this affluent microstate have its
own currency or would it be
better off as part of the Euro-
pean Union using its common
currency? Is it possible that an
economy the size of Karlsruhe
should have it own currency?
This is an important question
for Iceland because if the ques-
tion is answered in the negative,
then applying for EU member-
ship and adopting its single cur-
rency might best serve Iceland.
Optimum currency area considerations
We start with the obvious benefits of adopting the
euro and then turn to the costs in light of the opti-
mum-currency-area literature.14
Foreign trade as a fraction of GDP is surprisingly
low in Iceland. Also, exports are still dominated by
the fishing sector – although its share in total exports
has fallen sharply in the past 15 years or so15 – fol-
lowed by aluminium production, financial services,
and tourism.16 Figure 3 shows openness as a function
of size for a cross section of countries. Note that
Iceland is an outlier in the figure in that it is less
open than what one would expect based on its size.
The question arises whether adopting the euro
would increase Iceland’s trade with the rest of the
world.17 In a path-breaking study, Rose (2000) used
a cross section of countries to test for the effect of
exchange-rate fluctuations and currency union on
the volume of trade. He found that while the former
had a small negative effect, the latter had a big posi-
tive effect,i.e.it is not the fixed exchange rates per se
that promote trade but the feature of a currency
union as a whole.Breedon and Pétursson (2004) also
find that international trade would increase consid-
erably in Iceland if the country were to join the EU.
Experience from the euro zone tells us that trade
within the zone has increased significantly since the
adoption of the euro. In fact, data for France and
Germany show that within two years from the adop-
tion of the euro, their trade with other EU countries
had risen between 3 and 5 percent of GDP (Layard
et al. 2002). These results are confirmed by Micco,
Stein, and Ordoñez (2002) who find that between
1992 and 2001 the boost to intra-EMU trade was
about 18 to 35 percent;Bun and Klaassen (2002,p.1)
also find that the euro significantly increased trade,
with a long-run effect of about 40 percent.18 Baldwin
(2006) finds support for the “Rose effect”by looking
at both EMU and non-EMU currency unions and
concludes that the euro has already increased intra-
euro area trade significantly by 5 to 10 percent,
which is however somewhat less than the initial Rose
estimates.
The potential benefits of maintaining an indepen-
dent, floating currency are also very clear. Not sur-
prisingly, the business cycles of Iceland and conti-
nental Europe are not symmetric; the former being
mainly driven by variation in the catch of fish and its
price and that of aluminium in world markets.Also
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Spearman Rank Correlation -0.56
Openness is defined as (imports + exports)/GDP.
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Figure 3
13 Ranked 11th to 15th alongside Denmark, Finland and the UK.
14 A recent book of ours does exactly this by considering both the
possible benefits as well as the costs in light of this theory. See
Herbertsson and Zoega (2005).
15The share of fish products in the value of total exports is now just
over 55 percent but was in the range 75 to 80 percent as late as 1990
and hovered around 90 percent for much of the 20th century.
16 One possible reason for the low ratio of exports to GDP is the
high value added of the export industry. Exporting fish products
involves exporting a much higher value-added than exporting
many industrial goods or services.
17 There is a substantial theoretical literature on this topic. Ethier
(1973) and Demer (1991) found that exchange rate fluctuations
should reduce trade while others have reached different results.
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2001) used a general equilibrium
analysis and came to inconclusive results; exchange rate fluctua-
tions could either increase or reduce trade.
18 However,Berger and Nitsch (2005) find that considering a longer
time horizon makes the effect of the euro on the trade volumes dis-
appear.CESifo Forum 2/2006 45
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not surprisingly, the mobility of labour between
Iceland and the euro zone is limited,although rising.
In addition to the asymmetric shocks caused by fluc-
tuations in the fish catch and the terms of trade, the
government has followed a policy of encouraging
foreign direct investment in energy-intensive sec-
tors, such as the production of aluminium. Such in-
vestment projects are often huge in relation to the
overall size of the economy because the increased
energy production requires new hydro- or geother-
mal facilities. This is another source of asymmetric
demand shocks.
Flexible labour markets should make the adoption
of the euro easier. The labour market in Iceland is
very flexible by European standards when it comes
to its institutional structure. It may not seem impos-
sible that it offers sufficient flexibility to cushion the
effect of asymmetric shocks even in the absence of
an independent monetary policy. The Table com-
pares Iceland to the other OECD economies in
terms of several labour market institutions.Taxes on
labour are low (sum of income taxes and payroll
taxes) since the state relies to an unusually large
extent on indirect taxation for its revenue. The tax
wedge in Iceland is similar to that in the US,the UK,
Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and
Portugal.Turning to the benefit system, the level of
unemployment benefits is very low, comparable to
the Anglo-Saxon world but duration is high.19Union
density is high as is coverage but the unions are
coordinated so that they do take the macroeconom-
ic consequences of their actions into account.
Negotiated wages often serve as de-facto minimum
wages in that paid wages can never be lower but
often employers choose to pay higher wages. The
union leadership has in the past fifteen years or so
acted in a very responsible manner, taking produc-
tivity developments and macroeconomic data into
account when formulating their wage demands. We
should note that public sector unions have been
more aggressive than those for the private sector.
So,overall,in spite of apparently strong unions,they













Australia 28.6  32  1  35 99  1.5  2.4 
Austria 44.9  55  0.68  39  80  2.0  1.1 
Belgium 54.2  66  0.78  – 90  2.0 2.1 
Canada 32.3  64  0.42  36  36  1.0  0.6 
Denmark 41.5  59  1.00  76 69  2.0  1.5 
Finland 43.8  64  0.63  80  95  2.5  2.1 
France 47.4  71  0.47  10  95  1.5  3.1 
Germany 50.7  61  0.75  27 92  2.5  2.8 
Iceland 29.7  49  1  84  95  3.0  0.9 
Ireland 23.8  29  0.77  43  –  3.0  1.0 
Italy 45.7  52  0  37  82  2.5  1.0 
Japan 26.6  63  0  22  21  2.5  3.3 
Netherlands 43.6  71  0.64  24  85  3.0  2.6 
New Zealand  20.7  37  1  21  70  1.0  2.9 
Norway 36.9  66  0.60  55  31  2.0  2.4 
Portugal 32.6  78  0.58  25  71  2.0 1.0 
Spain 38  70  0.29  18  78  2.0  3.7 
Sweden 48  81  0.02  87  89  2.0  3.2 
Switzerland 28.8  72  0.31  23  53  1.5  2.4 
U.K. 31.2  45  0.96  35  40  1.0  1.3 
USA 29.6  56  0.22  14  17  1.0  0.5 
Source: OECD, Nickell (2003) and Herbertsson and Zoega (2005).  
Numbers refer to late 1990s. The tax wedge measures the sum of payroll contributions (by employee and employer 
alike) and income taxes (minus transfers) as a proportion of total labour costs. The unemployment benefits replacement 
ratio measures the ratio of benefits and average wages at the start of an unemployment spell for a single individual. The 
duration of unemployment benefits is measured by the weighted average of the replacement ratio in year two and year 
four of an unemployment spell divided by the ratio for the first year. Union density measures the fraction of the labour 
force belonging to a labour union while coverage measures the fraction of workers who get paid on the basis of union 
contracts. Coordination measures the extent to which the macroeconomic effects of wage contracts are taken into 
account, an index from 1 to 3 where 3 gives maximum coordination. Employment protection is measured on an index 
from 0 to 4 where the number 4 measures maximum protection.  
19 Benefits have so far not been related to previous income.
However, new legislation being proposed in Parliament does tie
benefits to past income up to a certain level.have not affected employment adversely in recent
times. Finally, employment protection is limited and
workers can generally be laid off with a three
months notice.20
With flexible institutions one might expect some
flexibility when it comes to hiring, firing and wage
setting. While hiring and firing occurs seamlessly,
there is more doubt about the flexibility of money
wages. A recent paper by one of us documents the
results of a survey of business managers where they
are asked if they would respond to an economic
downturn by cutting the wages of their employees.21
Only 9.4 percent responded affirmatively while
90.6 percent said they would not do so. The survey
results indicate that firms have a clear preference for
some workers over others and that in a recession
they prefer having the initiative and firing the least
desirable workers instead of cutting wages across the
board and leaving it to the workers to decide
whether to stay.22 The most important reasons for
not wanting to cut wages have to do with a desire to
retain experienced and productive workers to limit
the volume of overall turnover for the workforce. It
follows that money wages can be (downward) rigid
in spite of the absence of institutional impediments
to wage changes.
The preceding discussion shows that euro adoption
has both economic benefits and costs when consid-
ering Mundell’s criteria:trade would in all likelihood
increase and this would be very helpful for such a
small economy; but the combination of large and
asymmetric demand shocks, imperfect labour mobil-
ity and the downward rigidity of money wages may
cause employment to become more cyclical and per-
haps result in increased structural unemployment.
Of course, structural relationships could change if
the country joined the EU and adopted the euro.We
will later describe how labour market institutions
and union behaviour may change under these cir-
cumstances.
One could summarise the preceding discussion by
saying that the debate among economists has been
inconclusive and politics is supposed to take over.
Instead of going down that route – which is clearly
not our area of expertise – we will now discuss some
further economic reasons for Iceland either adopting
or rejecting the euro.
Microstates, micro-bureaucracies and global 
markets
Small government bureaucracies
Institutional independence requires efficient and
capable local bureaucracies. Running an effective
monetary policy and fiscal policy is dependent on
competent decision-making. The same can be said
about most other functions of the state. The writing
and passing of new laws requires a mature and siz-
able law profession, law enforcement requires com-
petent policing and so forth.The competence of the
bureaucracy is possibly related to the size of the pop-
ulation, ceteris paribus. If the population of Karls-
ruhe or the borough of Camden, London, to take an
example, had to come up with experts in monetary
economics and central banking as well as all other
areas of public policy, one might not be that sur-
prised to find out that the average competence of
each selected individual was lower than that of their
UK or German counterparts. How can Camden
compete with the UK and Karlsruhe with Germany
in this respect?
So what we called the island mentality at the begin-
ning of this paper is bound to lead to practical prob-
lems in a very small economy. While independence
may be deemed desirable, the day-to-day policy
making may be fraught with problems.The question
is how small countries have to be in order to run into
such problems. We are not aware of any empirical
work explaining differences in the performance of
bureaucracies with country size. In Iceland, as in all
other countries, different bureaucracies are in need
of competent, properly educated individuals and a
regulatory framework that both allows them to have
an influence and induces them to do their best. The
same applies to the university and many industries.It
must be difficult for a small group of professionals to
gather the necessary statistics, to analyse them, draw
reasonable conclusions and give proper advice and
then to find a central bank governor who is trained
to think independently about the quality of the
advice he receives and the optimal timing of interest
rate decisions.An increasingly integrated world with
large capital flows and carry trade would make this
task even more of a challenge.
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20 Mass layoffs do require the employer to consult with labour
unions and local authorities but these consultations are not costly
for firms and never impinge on the eventual decision to fire work-
ers
21 See Karlsson and Zoega (2005).
22 This may be due to wage compression within firms, which make
productivity differences exceed wage differences across workers,
hence making the most productive workers most desirable.CESifo Forum 2/2006 47
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Perhaps Iceland is just big enough to be able to have
efficient bureaucracies.World Bank data shows that
in a sample of 207 countries there are 43 with popu-
lations between 100 thousand and 1.3 million inhab-
itants. Of these, 26 are island economies. Perhaps
surprisingly, average per capita GDP in these small
countries in 1999 was 9,600 dollars while the compa-
rable figure for the sample of 207 countries was
6,900 dollars. Moreover, the average growth rates
were comparable between the two groups.23 How-
ever, these numbers are only indicative and do not
reflect directly on the quality of monetary policy
decisions.
The same problem may arise when it comes to the
writing and passing of new laws. In the past, this
problem was partly solved in Iceland by importing
Danish legislation (Denmark was after all the old
colonial power) and adapting it to local conditions.
Recently, the European Economic Area agreement
has brought in a lot of EU legislation and regulation.
Sometimes, importing foreign ideas takes more sub-
tle forms, a good example of which is the indepen-
dence of the central bank (by law since March 2001)
and its inflation-targeting policy, which mimics Bank
of England practices. But day-to-day decision-mak-
ing requires local experience, knowledge and com-
petence that cannot be imported.
Corruption and political influence on decision-
making
In a very small country it is unavoidable that most
people working in closely related areas know each
other personally. More or less all economists work-
ing in the public sector formulating policy in Iceland
are personally acquainted and the acquaintances
usually reach far into other areas as well. Unofficial
contacts take on prominence not seen in larger coun-
tries. The question must arise whether these are
impediments to proper decision-making or, alterna-
tively,help the system function more efficiently.As a
matter of fact, Iceland ranks high in the world in
terms of non-corruption and comes first in terms of
freedom of the press.24 A possible reason for this is
that reputation takes on more importance in such a
small society; improper behaviour may leave a stain
more permanent than if done in a larger country.
However,the distinction between efficiency-enhanc-
ing unofficial contacts and rent-seeking contacts may
sometimes be not so clear in practice. In a recent
paper, Knack and Azfar (2003) find no robust rela-
tionship between country size and corruption.
Financial stability under fixed vs. flexible exchange
rates
We now come to the question whether having a com-
petent bureaucracy in a microstate is sufficient for
the effective conduct of monetary policy in an in-
creasingly integrated world, as well as financial sta-
bility. Someone might suspect that a micro-currency
such as the Icelandic krona might be an easy prey for
the world’s currency speculators, dwarfing the
advantages of having an independent currency by
excessive exchange-rate fluctuations and threaten-
ing the stability of the financial system.
There are three traditional routes to financial in-
stability that have manifested themselves in recent
financial crises in the world:financial liberalization
with weak prudential regulation and supervision;
severe fiscal imbalances; and imprudent monetary
policy. Fortunately, none of these routes appear to
describe the recent or current situation in Ice-
land.25
Iceland has frequently experienced large current
account deficits, but rapid adjustment has taken
place in the past without significantly stressing the
Icelandic financial system. The economy has adjust-
ed to financial liberalization, while prudential regu-
lation and supervision is generally up to the task.
Fiscal imbalances are not a problem in Iceland;quite
the opposite, with Iceland having a good fiscal posi-
tion with low net government debt (less than 2 per-
cent of GDP in 2006) and a fully funded pension sys-
tem with assets amounting to more than 120 percent
of GDP. Furthermore, recent inflationary episodes
cannot be traced to lax monetary policy, which has
had some success – at least until quite recently – in
offsetting demand and keeping inflation near the
inflation target (particularly when housing prices are
excluded from the inflation measure). However,
Iceland has persistently run very large current ac-
count deficits, but current account deficits by them-
selves do not lead to financial instability.
Economies with a liberalized capital account and
fixed exchange rates are more vulnerable than eco-
nomies with flexible rates. This is not only because
23 See Thorvaldur Gylfason,“Size and Growth: Small States in the
Global Economy,” lecture at Harvard University, May 2002.
24 According to Transparency International.
25 Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson and Fredric S. Mishkin (2006). Financ-
ial Stability in Iceland: Reykjavik, Chamber of Commerce.imbalances are more likely to build up with fixed
exchange rates but also because prices are sticky and
as a consequence real exchange rate adjustments are
much slower than with floating rates.This can lead to
stagnation, deterioration in balance sheets of firms
and households and a more fragile financial system:
Italy is possibly a case in point as Nouriel Roubini
pointed out at the 2006 World Economic Forum
Meeting. Stanley Fisher has drawn attention to the
fact that each of the major international capital mar-
ket-related crises since 1994 – Mexico in 1994,
Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea in 1997, Russia and
Brazil in 1998, and Argentina and Turkey in 2000 –
have in some way involved a fixed or pegged ex-
change rate regime.At the same time, countries that
did not have pegged rates – among them South
Africa, Israel, and Mexico in 1998 – avoided crises
that afflicted emerging market countries with
pegged exchange rates.26
However, joining the Euro zone may contribute to a
more robust financial system. Since 2000, the bank-
ing system has been transformed from a local de-
positary system with assets amounting to approxi-
mately the country’s GDP to an international finan-
cial intermediator system with assets over five times
GDP. This has pushed the banks to finance them-
selves on the international capital market, which
might pose an increased risk to the financial system.
Iceland’s small size and openness make it more vul-
nerable because small changes in international
financial flows as a percentage of overall flows in
financial markets can have a huge impact on Ice-
land’s asset prices and particularly the exchange
rate. Self-fulfilling prophecies, in which concerns
about an Icelandic financial crisis could lead to mas-
sive withdrawals of Icelandic assets that would then
cause a financial crisis, cannot be ruled out. High
yielding currencies like the krona are particularly
prone to this risk because of the carry trade.This risk
would be eliminated under a credible fixed exchange
rate regime.
Welfare
Iceland’s choice of a currency arrangement may
also have microeconomic implications. Here we
consider the implications for the price level and
interest rates.
Imperfect competitions in goods markets
At the beginning of the 1990s, food prices were esti-
mated to be around 55 to 65 percent higher in Nor-
way,Sweden,and Finland than on average in the EU.
In 2005,prices were still 50 percent higher in Norway
but about 15 percent in Sweden and Finland, which
entered the EU in 1995.Prices had,however,already
fallen somewhat before the countries entered the
union, partly because they reformed their agricul-
tures before joining and partly because of lower
value added taxes on food.
The OECD estimates that prices of agricultural
products in Iceland were on average 120 percent
higher in the period 2002 to 2004 than world prices.
A comparable figure for the EU was 30 percent.It is
estimated that the food bill of the average Icelandic
household could drop by as much as 5 percent if the
country joined the EU due to lower prices of agri-
cultural products. It is of course possible that the
Icelanders could accomplish this without member-
ship of the EU, and without adopting the euro, sim-
ply by reforming their agricultural system and allow-
ing more competition from abroad. However, EU
membership could provide the necessary political
cover for such drastic and probably controversial
actions.
The risk premium and interest rates
It is fairly obvious that small currencies like the Ice-
landic krona are more fragile than big currencies
such as the euro. As a consequence, world capital
markets have to charge a higher risk premium on
small currencies other things being equal.As a mat-
ter of fact, this is reflected in credit default swap
spreads (CDS spreads) that the Icelandic credit sys-
tem enjoys.
Until recently, risk was not properly priced in
financial markets. For example, the CDS spread on
Icelandic bank bonds was only around 20 basis
points, which meant that you could buy Icelandic
bank bonds and a 20 basis point insurance in the
credit market and you would have a paper which
would bear approximately the same estimated risk
as US treasury bonds.It is obvious that the risk was
not priced correctly. In recent months, credit mar-
kets have started to demand a higher risk premi-
um. The CDS spreads are at the moment around
70 basis points, a premium possibly reflecting bet-
ter the true risk associated with the krona.Further-
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more, it is likely that foreign banks might set up
subsidiaries in Iceland with the introduction of the
common currency, and thereby suppress the inter-
est rates even further, some say by an additional
50 basis points.
Politics
The literature on optimum currency areas has often
neglected the implications of the Lucas critique for
the debate. Decision rules of agents in the labour
market – as well as the government in power – may
vary systematically with changes in the monetary
regime, hence one cannot keep behaviour – such as
unions’ objective functions and the government’s fis-
cal policy – constant while contemplating giving up
monetary authority and joining a single currency.27
Endogenous labour market institutions 
Although unions in the private sector in Iceland
have in recent years played a fairly constructive role,
usually taking macroeconomic factors into account,
this may change. Also, public sector unions have in
recent years been more militant. In a monetary
union, labour unions may change their behaviour.
Cukierman and Lippi (1999) argue that a centralised
labour union that dislikes inflation is likely to
restrain real-wage demands with an independent
currency in order to keep unemployment down and
hence reduce the incentive to inflate. In a monetary
union, this tendency is diminished as the union now
has less to fear from a supranational central bank.
This poses an externality problem: A large union in
any member country imposes a negative externality
on other countries by demanding higher real wages
resulting in higher domestic unemployment. The
externality is felt in higher rates of inflation in other
countries. Similarly, there is an external benefit to
wage moderation by a large, national union. An
opposing effect takes the form of a large union in
one country being able,through wage moderation,to
induce companies to relocate from other countries,
hence raising domestic employment and reducing
foreign employment. A fall in domestic wages leads
over time to an outward shift in the labour-demand
schedule,which can later generate both higher wages
and employment. This effect would tend to reduce
real wages everywhere and raise employment. It is
not clear which of the two effects is stronger.
How would EU membership constrain Iceland’s
government?
Since Iceland’s labour market is already quite flexi-
ble,incentives for labour-market reforms may not be
that important. There are of course Sibert and
Sutherland (1997), who argue that the incentive for
labour-market reform is likely to be reduced when
monetary independence is lost.28 The pressure is
reduced in a monetary union because the European
central bank also takes into account unemployment
in other countries. High structural unemployment in
one country imposes a negative externality in the
form of an inflation bias on other countries, and a
low level of structural unemployment in any one
country imposes a positive externality on other
countries in the monetary union because of a reduc-
ed inflation bias. The externality arises because of
the centralised nature of monetary policy and the
decentralised nature of labour-market policy.29
A counterargument is due to Calmfors (1998), who
argues that monetary union would hasten labour
market reforms. He starts out by assuming that the
business cycle could become more severe within the
monetary union due to loss of monetary policy and
incomplete price- and wage flexibility. With cyclical
unemployment more volatile, pressures for reforms
meant to reduce structural unemployment are likely
to build if there is increasing marginal disutility of
unemployment in the minds of policy makers or
labour-market participants. A higher variance of
cyclical unemployment reduces expected utility in
such a setting but reducing average – or structural –
27 Hochreiter and Winckler (1995) test the Mundell conditions for
Austria in the late 1970s and find that these fail in terms of the
asymmetry of shocks, real-wage rigidity and factor mobility.
However, from looking at the 1980s and early 1990s, they find that
wages (and unit labour costs) behaved differently than in the 1970s
in the sense that wage settlements responded to low growth and
structural problems in the 1990s but rose at a rate which exceeded
productivity growth in the 1970s.
28 This occurs if the incentive to inflate is larger at higher rates of
equilibrium unemployment because voters do not differentiate
between a high cyclical and a high structural unemployment – the
pressure to inflate is higher at high levels of structural unemploy-
ment. For this reason, the pressure to undertake fundamental
labour-market reforms is higher in countries that have their own
monetary policy,as this is likely to reduce the temptation to inflate.
29 Another argument in the same direction is due to Calmfors
(1998) who emphasizes the complementarity of labour-market
reforms and monetary policy. Successful reforms lead to a fall in
equilibrium unemployment but actual unemployment only gradu-
ally converges to this new equilibrium. The speed of adjustment
depends on the speed at which real wages can be reduced.This can
come about through either an absolute decline in nominal wages
and/or an increase in the general price level.Of the two,an increase
in the price level is likely to reduce real wages faster as resistance
to nominal-wage cuts appear to be endemic in market economies,
perhaps because of workers’ concern about relative wages.Since an
independent monetary policy can be used to reduce real wages
through a higher price level, such countries are more likely to
embark on reforms.unemployment raises expected utility for a given
variance of cyclical unemployment.
A more promising change of behaviour by the
Icelandic government would take the form of a more
activist fiscal policy – now its discretionary part is
quite neutral and automatic stabilisers left to do the
work – and also a greater aversion to publicly
planned investment projects such as those in the
energy intensive sectors. Hence, the need for an
independent monetary policy may diminish if the
country joins the EU and adopts the euro, but of
course this might be an optimistic view keeping in
mind the current fiscal situation of some member
states and the level of the real exchange rate in
Portugal, Spain, and Italy.
Concluding remarks
We have found, not surprisingly, that Iceland does
not satisfy Mundell’s optimum currency area crite-
ria; it has asymmetric shocks, imperfect labour
mobility, and downward rigidity of money wages.
However, Mundell was not oblivious to the gains
from a single currency in the form of increased trade
and lower transaction costs, quite the contrary. In
light of Europe’s experience with the euro raising
trade volumes, Iceland should benefit from its adop-
tion but possibly paying the cost in terms of greater
employment fluctuations.
The benefits of an independent monetary policy are
dependent on a well functioning central bank, gov-
ernment bureaucracies and political structures.
These might be more difficult to generate in micro-
states such as Iceland. Furthermore, it might be ben-
eficial for Iceland to adopt the European currency to
avoid the turbulence surrounding speculations (the
carry trade) in international financial markets.
In terms of growth potentials and welfare, the euro
could be expected to bring lower long-term interest
rates, perhaps in the range of 50 to 100 basis points.
This would of course increase capital investment and
labour productivity.The euro might lower consumer
prices by facilitating a comparison with other euro
countries. Not surprisingly, a few firms often domi-
nate markets in microstates, especially when it
comes to services. The adoption of the euro might
lead to lower domestic prices through not only price
comparisons but also the entry of European firms in
sectors such as banking, insurance, and retailing.
In sum,the quality of monetary policy decision-mak-
ing has to be convincing for anyone to be willing to
sacrifice increased trade, lower interest rates, and
perhaps lower consumer prices that would likely fol-
low the adoption of the euro. The verdict on this is
still out!
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